tencing laws, Andrade's minimum three-strikes term may not be reduced by credit for good behavior or working while in prison. Cervera, 16 P.3d at 181. Andrade therefore must serve a minimum of 50 years in prison before he is eligible for parole.

The unavailability of parole for a half century makes Andrade's sentence substantially more severe than the life sentence at issue in Rummel. There, Rummel was eligible for parole in as few as 12 years. In contrast, Andrade must serve more than four times the length of Rummel's sentence before he becomes eligible for parole. See also Smallwood v. Johnson, 73 F.3d 1343, 1346, 1352 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding a 50-year sentence for a non-violent recidivist only after noting that the defendant would be eligible for parole within 12 years); Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1284 (stating that the availability of parole is relevant to determining whether the length of the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment).

Indeed, Andrade's sentence is the functional equivalent of the sentences at issue in Solem and Harmelin -- life in prison without the possibility of parole. A "life sentence without parole is the second most severe penalty permitted by law," Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001, and is the same sentence that the Supreme Court held unconstitutional when imposed on a seven-time felony recidivist in Solem. Andrade was 37 years old at the time of his sentencing and will be 87 years old when he is first eligible for parole. The life expectancy of a

appear in these cases that the sentencing judge or official was required to impose consecutive sentences. Hawkins v. Hargett , 200 F.3d 1279, 1280 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The trial judge ordered that the[ ] sentences be served consecutively . . . ."); United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 262 (2d Cir. 1988) ("The district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence."); see also Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Superintendent imposed consecutive "sentences" denying yard privileges to a prisoner, a sanction "authorized by state law").

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