SNEED, Circuit Judge, Concurring in part and Dissenting in part:

I agree with the Majority's conclusion in Part II that Andrade filed the functional equivalent of a timely notice of appeal. I respectfully dissent, however, from the Majority's conclusion in Parts IV and V that Andrade's sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.

The sentence imposed in this case is not one of the"exceedingly rare" terms of imprisonment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-290 (1983) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) ("Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare."))). Two consecutive sentences of 25 years to life--with parole eligibility only after the minimum 50 years--is obviously severe. Nevertheless, it is the sentence mandated by the citizens of California through the democratic initiative process and, additionally, legislated by their elected representatives. Cal. Pen. Code � 667(e)(2)(A) ("three strikes" provision mandating minimum term of 25 years for recidivist felon); Cal. Pen. Code � 1170.12 (codifying state-wide initiative identical to "three strikes" legislation).

It has long been the law of this Circuit that, "[g]enerally, as long as the sentence imposed on a defendant does not exceed statutory limits, this court will not overturn it on Eighth Amendment grounds." U.S. v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114,

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