We hold that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent when it held, on Andrade's direct appeal, that his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Our decision does not invalidate California's Three Strikes law generally. Rather, we conclude that it is unconstitutional only as applied to Andrade because it imposes a sentence grossly disproportionate to his crimes.

I. BACKGROUND

A. California's Three Strikes Law

California's Three Strikes law consists of a pair of substantively identical statutes both enacted in 1994, one by the California Legislature, Stats.1994, ch. 12, � 1, adding California Penal Code � 667(b)-(i), and one by a ballot initiative, Proposition 184, � 1, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994), adding California Penal Code � 1170.12. See generally In re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176, 177 (Cal. 2001).

The purpose of the law is to impose longer terms of imprisonment on defendants with prior qualifying felony convic-

from a supermarket. 525 U.S. 1114, 119 S. Ct. at 891. Riggs was convicted of petty theft with a prior (Cal. Penal Code� 666), which counted as his "third-strike" offense under California's Three Strikes law. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Riggs' sentence, and the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. In his memorandum opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, noted that the Eighth Amendment issue presented was "obviously substantial, particularly since California appears to be the only State in which a misdemeanor could receive such a severe sentence." Id. Nevertheless, he concluded that the issue should first be addressed by a lower federal court or the California Supreme Court, stating that Riggs could assert his claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "since [he] is asking us to apply a settled rule of Eighth Amendment law." Id. at 892. Justice Breyer wrote separately, agreeing with Justice Stevens that Riggs raised a"serious question" but dissenting from the denial of certiorari. Id.

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